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Sacred values, such as those associated with religious or ethnic identity, underlie many important
individual and group decisions in life, and individuals typically resist attempts to trade off their
sacred values in exchange for material beneﬁts. Deontological theory suggests that sacred values
are processed based on rights and wrongs irrespective of outcomes, while utilitarian theory suggests
that they are processed based on costs and beneﬁts of potential outcomes, but which mode of pro-
cessing an individual naturally uses is unknown. The study of decisions over sacred values is difﬁcult
because outcomes cannot typically be realized in a laboratory, and hence little is known about the
neural representation and processing of sacred values. We used an experimental paradigm that used
integrity as a proxy for sacredness and which paid real money to induce individuals to sell their per-
sonal values. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), we found that values that
people refused to sell (sacred values) were associated with increased activity in the left temporopar-
ietal junction and ventrolateral prefrontal cortex, regions previously associated with semantic rule
retrieval. This suggests that sacred values affect behaviour through the retrieval and processing of
deontic rules and not through a utilitarian evaluation of costs and beneﬁts.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Sacred values include fundamental religious beliefs,
core constructs of national and ethnic identities and
moral norms. These values motivate many important
individual and group decisions in life. Decisions
bounded by them range from purchasing consumer
goods such as kosher foods, patronizing Christian
businesses, investing in socially responsible mutual
funds, to deciding whom to marry. Disagreements
over sacred values also contribute to many political
and military conﬂicts and may also underlie some
acts of political violence [1,2]. Thus, understanding
how sacred values are represented and processed
in the human mind has far-reaching implications
for policymakers.
By deﬁnition, personal sacred values are values for
which individuals resist trade-offs with other values,
particularly economic or materialistic incentives [3].
The nature of sacred values is, in large part, deﬁned
by the way in which individuals engage them in
decisions, but virtue theory suggests two very different
ways in which sacred values might be processed [4].
Sacred values could be either deontological in nature
[5] or they could be utilitarian [6,7]. Deontic process-
ing is deﬁned by an emphasis on rights and wrongs,
whereas utilitarian processing is characterized by
costs and beneﬁts. Similarly, deontic processing
tends to be absolute and independent of outcomes,
while utilitarian processing depends on the relative
valuation of outcomes. Utility theory has emerged as
a normative framework for the latter [8,9], and when
applied to decisions over sacred values, suggests that
the expectation of consequences for violating these
values is a deterrent to certain behaviours [10]. Lexi-
cographic preferences, in which an agent inﬁnitely
prefers one thing to another, have also been used
to model sacred values within the utilitarian frame-
work [11]. In contrast, the deontic approach suggests
that sacred values are derived from rules that circum-
scribe certain actions independently of expected
outcomes or prospects of success, and that we act in
accordance with them because they are the right
thing to do [3,10].
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decision-makers’ self-reports via ratings, rankings or
rationale, which are often taken as evidence in favour
of one theory or the other. Although insightful, these
reports may be inﬂuenced by the context of being
studied and what are perceived as socially acceptable
reasons for doing things. Because it is very difﬁcult to
provide realistic outcomes for sacred decisions in an
experiment, it is hard to measure behavioural par-
ameters that would allow one to infer the structure of
the sacred value decision space. Functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI) has emerged as a viable
tool to measure brain regions associated with different
aspects of decision-making, and the growing literature
on the neural correlates of moral judgement has
demonstrated that deontic and utilitarian processing
are associated with different brain regions [12–17].
While the previous literature has elucidated which
brain regions become active when individuals engage
either deontic or utilitarian reasoning, the question
remains as to how individuals naturally represent
sacred values when not forced into a particular frame-
work of decision-making. For example, one might
consider the permissibility of killing a human being
(the sanctity of human life being a common sacred
value) in terms of rights and wrongs or in terms of con-
sequences (e.g. legal sanctions or the effect on the
victim’s family), and either mode can be imposed by
a particular experimental situation. Here, we use
fMRI to determine whether sacred values are naturally
represented as deontological rules or utilitarian values,
unconstrained by a choice.
Clearly, this project presents some methodological
challenges. It is not possible, nor desirable to request
participants in an experiment to make actual decisions
that would violate their values. However, we can use
an element of sacredness that captures many of the
key characteristics in the laboratory: integrity. Here,
integrity refers to an individual’s consistency of
values and actions. For example, although we cannot
(and do not wish to) test whether an individual is will-
ing to kill an innocent human being, we can test their
willingness to sign a document that says they would.
Although signing such a document does not bind the
person to that action, it creates an inconsistency
between value and action that signals a loss of integrity.
It is reasonable to assume that if something is truly
sacred, then an individual would maintain their integ-
rity for that value and not sign such a document. What
if they were offered money to sign? It then becomes a
trade-off between the monetary gain and the cost in
personal integrity. In such a scenario, the amount
of money required is one measure of integrity for a
particular value, as is their willingness to set a price
in the ﬁrst place.
If sacred values are represented in a utilitarian
manner, then prior neuroeconomic research suggests
that they should be associated with increased neural
activity in brain regions associated with the calculation
of utility. Because sacred values are preferred above all
else, these values should elicit the highest activity in
regions processing utility. The most likely regions
include ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC)
[18,19], striatum/nucleus accumbens [20–22] and
parietal cortex [23,24]. Alternatively, if sacred values
are represented as deontic rules, then brain regions
associated with the processing of moral permissibility
(rights and wrongs) should show increased activity,
with the temporoparietal junction (TPJ) and the
MPFC being the most commonly implicated regions
[17,25]. Additionally, because rights and wrongs
tend to be absolute and stored as rules, deontic process-
ing should also be associated with the retrieval and
processing of semantic knowledge. The literature on
brain regions involved in semantic retrieval is extensive;
however, common themes have emerged with respect to
rule retrieval. Several studies have shown that the ven-
trolateral prefrontal cortex (VLPFC) supports storage
or retrieval of semantic forms of stimulus–response
contingencies, which are usually referred to as rules
[26–30]. Moreover, ‘the VLPFC may be more broadly
involved in the retrieval and selection of representations
that help to guide and constrain action through stored
knowledge’ [31]. Thus, if sacred values are naturally
processed in a utilitarian manner, one would expect to
see activity in VMPFC, striatum and parietal cortex;
or, if they are processed deontologically, one would
expect to see activity in the TPJ and VLPFC.
2. METHODS
(a) Participants
Forty-three adult participants (see the electronic
supplementary material for demographics) took part
in the study, which was approved by the Emory
University Institutional Review Board. Of these, 11
participated in the experiment outside of the scanner
and 32 participated in the scanner. We present behav-
ioural data for all participants and imaging data for
those who were scanned. All participants reported
good health with no history of psychiatric and
neurological disorders and gave written informed
consent. Participants received $40 base pay ($20 for
those not scanned) and were given the opportunity
to earn more money by auctioning their personal
values (see §2b).
To conﬁrm generalizability of the fMRI data to a
broader sample and to examine the relationship
between sacred values and group involvement, we also
collected data online. An online sample of 391 partici-
pants was recruited via the Study Response Project
(http://studyresponse.syr.edu) to participate in a
survey. Each participant received a compensation of
$5. Fifty-seven participants had at least one missing
value in the dependent measure, a list of 31 statements.
This resulted in an effective sample of n ¼ 334 (164
females, 165 males and ﬁve did not indicate gender)
with ages ranging from 21 to 69 years (M ¼ 41.9).
This sample was more diverse and more representative
of the US population than typical student samples.
(b) Experimental task
The experimental task was designed to measure the
neural responses to statements of personal values
that ranged from the mundane to the sacred and test
the utilitarian versus deontic representation of sacred-
ness. As a proxy for sacredness, we measured integrity
by an individual’s willingness to accept real money to
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(see the electronic supplementary material for details).
The task was divided into four phases (one to three in
the scanner). To prevent strategic responding, the
instructions for the fourth (auction) phase were given
only immediately prior to that phase. First, in the pas-
sive phase, participants were presented with value
statements phrased in the second person, one at a time.
No decision was required. Statements ranged from
values that were thought to represent mundane prefer-
e n c e s — e . g .‘ Y o ua r ead o gp e r s o n ’a n d‘ Y o ua r eaP e p s i
drinker’—to values describing attributions or acts that
were thought to be sacred—e.g. ‘You believe in God’
a n d‘ Y o ua r ew i l l i n gt ok i l la ni n n o c e n th u m a nb e i n g . ’
Every statement also had a complement—e.g. ‘You are
acatperson,’‘YouareaCokedrinker,’‘Youdonotbelieve
in God,’ and ‘You are not willing to kill an innocent
human being.’ A total of 62 pairs of statements (124 indi-
vidualstatements)werepresentedinarandomorder.The
purpose of this phase was to record a choiceless response
to each statement and see whether utility or deontic sys-
tems dominate processing. Next, in the active phase,
complementary statements were presented together,
and for each pair, the participant had to choose one of
the statements. In the third phase, the hypothetical
phase, each statement chosen in the active phase was pre-
sented with a hypothetical offer of money to disavow the
choice they had made in the active phase. For example,
if someone previously chose ‘You believe in God,’ then
the offer was, ‘Is there a dollar amount that you would
accept to disavow your belief in God for the rest of your
life?’
In the fourth phase, the auction phase, participants
were given the opportunity to sell their answers from
the active phase for real money. Using the Becker–
DeGroot–Marshak (BDM) auction mechanism,
participants were instructed to specify an ‘ask’ price
for each of the statements they chose in the active
phase [32]. The price could range from $1 to $100.
The BDM auction is generally accepted be an incen-
tive-compatible mechanism to reveal an individual’s
willingness to pay for something. Here, we use it as a
willingness to accept. Submitting an ask price of $1,
for example, means that the individual is willing to
accept any amount of money and is assured of receiv-
ing some amount, which, on average, would be $50. In
contrast, an ask price of $100 means that there would
only be a 1 per cent chance of receiving money. Import-
antly, they could also opt out of the auction for any or
all items, choosing not to alter their answer. Each
item was classiﬁed based on whether the participant
submitted a price in the auction (bid) or opted out of
the auction (optout). Submitting a price meant that
the participant was willing to exchange this item for
money. Opting out meant that the value was non-nego-
tiable or that the amount we offered for the value was
not high enough. This provided us with a classiﬁcation
for sacred and non-sacred values.
After all of the ask values were obtained, the partici-
pant rolled a pair of 10-sided dice for each of the items
for which an ask price was put. If the dice roll was
greater than their ask price, they received the value
of the dice roll for that item. Their ﬁnal payment
was the average of all items sold and not sold. At the
end of the auction phase, the participant received a
printout of their chosen statements (active phase),
which they did not sell in the auction, and the new
statements, which were the complements of the state-
ments sold in the auction. The printout had to be
signed. Prior to the auction, participants knew they
would have to sign the ﬁnal document of their personal
values. In this manner, the signing of the ﬁnal docu-
ment provided an additional incentive to reveal true
value. To determine the temporal stability of their per-
sonal values, participants repeated the active phase
choices through an online survey 6–14 months fol-
lowing their fMRI scan. At that point, they were also
asked to indicate how they arrived at their decision:
rights and wrongs, costs and beneﬁts or neither.
The latter responses were subsequently used to
create a functional localizer for deontic and utilitarian
processing in the brain.
(c) Follow-up survey
fMRI participants completed a follow-up survey 6–14
months after their scan session. The purpose was to
determine the stability of each person’s values and
whether their decision for each pair in the active
phase was primarily deontic or utilitarian. This was
conducted through surveymonkey.com and offered
an additional $20 compensation for completion.
Twenty-eight of 32 (87.5%) participants completed
the survey. The survey repeated the active phase,
prompting for a choice between complementary
items. Following each choice, the participant was
asked to indicate how they arrived at their decision.
The following three choices were offered: (i) right
and wrong; (ii) costs and beneﬁts; and (iii) neither.
(d) Neuroimaging data
Neuroimaging data were collected using a 3 T Siemens
Magnetron Trio whole body scanner (Siemens Medical
Systems, Erlangen, Germany). Functional data consisted
of 33 axial slices that were sampled with a thickness of
3.5 mm and encompassing a ﬁeld of view of 192 mm
with an inplane resolution of 64   64 (T2*-weighted,
TR ¼ 2000 ms, TE ¼ 30 ms). Each participant com-
pleted four runs with 62 trials each, whose length
depended on participants’decision time (two runs of pas-
sive, one run each of active and hypothetical). The
auction was done outside of the scanner.
fMRI data were analysed using SPM5 (Wellcome
Department of Imaging Neuroscience, University
College London) using a standard two-stage random-
effects regression model. Data were subjected to
standard pre-processing, including motion correction,
slice-timing correction, normalization to a Montreal
Neurologic Institute (MNI) template brain and
smoothing using an isotropic Gaussian kernel (full-
width half-maximum ¼ 8 mm). Statistical thresholds
were determined based on the estimated smoothness
of the second-level contrasts. Using the AlphaSim rou-
tine in analysis of functional neuroimages (AFNI), we
estimated the combination of height and extent
thresholds that yielded a whole-brain false discovery
rate (FDR) less than 0.05. Using a voxel-level threshold
of p , 0.005, the extent threshold that yielded a
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A 40 per cent grey matter mask was applied to all
contrasts before using these thresholds.
First,afunctional localizer fordeonticversusutilitar-
ian processing was obtained from the active phase.
Using the responses from the follow-up survey which
characterized the mode of processing for each trial, a
ﬁrst-level model consisting of three conditions was cre-
ated: (i) right/wrong; (ii) cost/beneﬁt; and (iii) neither.
Regions involved in deontic processing were identiﬁed
by the contrast of (right/wrong—cost/beneﬁt), and
utilitarian processing regions were identiﬁed by (cost/
beneﬁt—right/wrong). Second, the regions of interest
(ROIs) obtained from the functional localizer were
then used to mask the contrasts in the passive phase.
For the ﬁrst-level modelof the passive phase, eachstate-
ment was categorized based on the participant’s
subsequent choice in the active phase (chosen versus
not chosen) and whether they submitted an ask value
during the auction (bid versus optout). This created
four conditions: (i) chosen/optout; (ii) chosen/bid;
(iii)notchosen/optout;and(iv)notchosen/bid.Clearly,
items that were not chosen could not be sold, but
because the auction was to switch from the chosen to
the not chosen item, they were implicitly part of the
choice process. One participant was excluded from the
analysis because they submitted bids of $1 for all
items, and thus no contrasts could be formed. The
contrast from the ﬁrst-level main effect of optout–
bid was input into a second-level model and then
masked with the (right/wrong—cost/beneﬁt) and (cost/
beneﬁt—right/wrong) maps from the functional local-
izers. Within each ROI, the average activation across
subjects was tested for signiﬁcance with a t-test. Third,
to identify additional regions that might contribute to
sacred values, we performed a whole-brain analysis on
the passive phase of optout versus bid by examining
the contrast: ((chosen/optout þ not chosen/optout)—
(chosen/bid þ not chosen/bid)). Mean differential
activation between optout–bid in ROIs identiﬁed from
this contrast was also correlated with subject-speciﬁc
attributes, including subject age, religiosity, liberalism/
conservatism and activism.
(e) Alternative models
To evaluate the possibility of alternative interpretations
of the activation patterns, four additional models were
tested. Each of these models included a speciﬁc aspect
of the stimulus as either a condition or covariate in
the ﬁrst-level model, and thus controlled for it as a
‘nuisance’ variable.
— Legaldoctrine. Given that manysacred values are also
represented in legal doctrine, we sought to control
for the possibility that participants were simply pro-
cessing statements as lawful or not. To do this, we
removed legality statements into their own category
and tested the original model on non-legality state-
ments. If one item of a complimentary pair was
illegal either by US or international law, then it
was coded as a legality item. For example, ‘You
would kill an innocent human being’ and ‘North
Korea should be nuked’ were coded as legality
items (as well as their complementary statements),
while ‘You believe in God’ and ‘You are a Repub-
lican’ were coded as non-legal items (as well as
their complements) because neither item in those
pairs is governed by legal doctrine. A ﬁrst-level
model was created with ﬁve conditions: four for the
non-legality items (chosen/optout, chosen/bid, not
chosen/optout and not chosen/bid) and one for the
legality items. Using the ROIs from the original
model, we tested for the signiﬁcance of the main
effect of optout–bid for only the non-legality items
in a second-level model.
— Syntax of statement. A similar procedure was done to
testfor theeffectofthesyntaxoftheitem,withthose
items phrased as ‘You are...’ removed into their
own category, allowing us to test optout-bid on
only the ‘You would do...’ statements.
— Statement length. To control for the length of the
statement, each condition was modulated by the
number of words in the statement, which served
as a nuisance regressor.
— Semantic richness. Semantic richness (SR) refers to
the amount of semantic information contained in,
or associated with, a concept in semantic memory
[33]. SR has been previously associated with acti-
vation in VLPFC [34–36]. To test the possibility
that SR may be partially confounded with our
measures of sacredness (e.g. ‘God’ has more
associations than ‘Pepsi’), we formulated an
alternative model that controlled for the SR of
the statements.
3. RESULTS
Participantsexhibitedawiderangeofchoiceswithsome
participants auctioning nearly all of their answers while
others very few (mean ¼ 58.6%, range: 8.1–100%).
The aggregate distribution of ask values was bimodal,
with most being either $1 or optout and a declining
tail between the two extremes (see the electronic sup-
plementary material). There was an approximately
ordinal and concave relationship between the fraction
of individuals submitting bids to change an answer for
a particular item and the fraction of individuals who
stated they would hypothetically accept money to
change their behaviour (ﬁgure 1). Follow-up 6–14
months after the initial experiment showed a high
degree of stability of sacred values (96.4% consistent),
and that sacred values were more stable than non-
sacred values (paired t27 ¼ 7.81, p , 0.001). In
addition, 73.2 per cent of the time participants selected
‘right/wrong’ as the rationale for choosing a sacred
value. In comparison, only 27.8 per cent of the time
was the ‘right/wrong’ rationale used to explain choice
for items that were not sacred (i.e. those for which a
bid was submitted in the auction).
To determine whethera stimulus naturally prompted
deontological or utilitarianprocessing, weexamined the
brain activity during the passive phase. Being the ﬁrst
and unconstrained phase of the experiment, and the
only one in which items were presented individually,
yielded a window into the natural processing of these
values.Beforeanalysingthisphase,afunctionallocalizer
for deontic versus utilitarian processing was obtained
from the active phase. Using the responses from the
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cessing for each trial, regions involved in deontic
processing were identiﬁed by the contrast of (right/
wrong—cost/beneﬁt), and utilitarian processing regions
were identiﬁed by (cost/beneﬁt—right/wrong). Only the
left TPJ was identiﬁed as a deontic region, but the orbi-
tofrontal cortex (OFC), and left and right inferior
parietal lobules were identiﬁed as utilitarian (ﬁgure 2).
Second, the regions obtained from the functional locali-
zer were then used to mask the contrasts in the passive
phase. For the ﬁrst-level model of the passive phase,
each statement was categorized based on the partici-
pant’s subsequent choice in the active phase (chosen
versus not chosen) and whether they submitted an ask
value during the auction (bid versus optout). This cre-
ated four conditions: (i) chosen/optout; (ii) chosen/
bid; (iii) not chosen/optout; and (iv) not chosen/bid.
The main effect of optout–bid was input into a
second-level model and then masked with the deontic
and utilitarian maps from the functional localizers.
The left TPJ was signiﬁcantly more active to optout
items compared with bid items (t30 ¼ 3.19, p ¼
0.0034). Both the left and right parietal ROIs were
more active for the bid items compared with the
optout items (t30 ¼ 2.59 and 2.04, p ¼ 0.015 and
0.05, respectively), but the OFC was not (t30 ¼ 0.13,
p ¼ 0.42). To determine if there were additional regions
associated with processing sacred values not identiﬁed
by the functional localizer, we also performed a
whole-brain analysis of the passive phase contrast
optout-bid, which additionally included the left
VLPFC,dorsomedialPFCandrightamygdala(ﬁgure3).
4. DISCUSSION
These results provide strong evidence that when indi-
viduals naturally process statements about sacred
values, they use neural systems associated with evalu-
ating rights and wrongs (TPJ) and semantic rule
retrieval (VLPFC) but not systems associated with
utility. The involvement of the TPJ is consistent with
the conjecture that moral sentiments exist as context-
independent knowledge in temporal cortex [14,37].
Both the left and right TPJ have been associated
with belief attribution during moral judgements of
third parties [17]. Our results show that it is also
involved in the evaluation of personal sacred values
without decision constraints. Thus, one explanation
for the reduction in morally prohibited judgements
when the TPJ is disrupted by transcranial magnetic
stimulation [25] is because disruption impairs access
to personal deontic knowledge.
The involvement of the left VLPFC in personal
sacred values is also consistent with the conjecture
that deontic rules are retrieved and processed as
semantic knowledge as opposed to utility calculations.
Although the VLPFC has been historically implicated
in language function, more recent neuroimaging work
has demonstrated that the particular area we identiﬁed
as processing sacred values is associated with semantic
rule retrieval and processing [27–29]. Importantly, the
function of the left VLPFC is not restricted to verbal
or written rules. In a study of road signs, the anterior
division of the left VLPFC was found to be most
closely associated with rule retrieval [28]. We observed
the same division more active when participants
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Figure 1. Relationship of auction behaviour to hypothetical solicitation of money. Averaged over participants (n ¼ 43), each
point represents one pair of personal values. The fraction of individuals submitting auction bids to change their answer for
a given pair is plotted against the fraction of individuals who indicated that hypothetically they would accept money to
change the corresponding behaviour. These two measurements are highly correlated (adjusted R
2 ¼ 0.87 for quadratic).
Items in the lower left (sacred) had a low percentage of individuals willing to accept either hypothetical or real money.
These items pertained to the sanctity of human life, especially children. Items in the upper right (non-sacred) had a high per-
centage of individuals willing to accept both hypothetical and real money to change and represented utilitarian preferences
(e.g. Coke versus Pepsi and dog versus cat). Despite this correlation, all of the points lie above the diagonal, indicating a
hypothetical bias (participants sold more often than they said they would hypothetically). The mode of decision-making
(inset) was signiﬁcantly different for statements that were not auctioned (optout) versus those that were (bid) (F2,132 ¼
58.7, p , 0.001). Light grey bars, optout; dark grey bars, bid.
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found in a language-based study of rules, with this
region being implicated in top-down retrieval of
semantic knowledge [27].
Although activation of the left TPJ and VLPFC for
sacred values is consistent with a deontic rule retrieval
process, it could be explained by properties of the
stimuli, as opposed to how participants processed the
stimuli. One possibility is that the items deemed
sacred (optout), are governed by legal doctrine and
thus the left VLPFC activity simply reﬂected the
retrieval and processing of a legal rule (e.g. it is illegal
to kill people). To test this, we created another model
in which we added a separate category for items gov-
erned by a legal doctrine. An item was coded as a
legal doctrine if it or its complement were illegal,
either by US or international law (Geneva Conven-
tions). The original analysis was then repeated on
the remaining items. Using the original ROIs, we
found that the effect of optout–bid was still signiﬁcant
in the left VLPFC (t30 ¼ 2.15, p ¼ 0.040). Thus, even
for items not governed by any rule of law (e.g. believ-
ing in God), if the individual did not sell it, it was
retrieved and processed as a rule. We also tested the
possibility that sacred values involve concepts, like
God, which have more meanings than mundane con-
cepts such as dogs and cats. SR refers to the amount
of semantic information contained in, or associated
with, a concept in semantic memory [33] and has
been previously associated with activation in VLPFC
[34–36]. To test the possibility that SR may be par-
tially confounded with our measures of sacredness,
we formulated an alternative model that controlled
for the SR of the statements. There was no signiﬁcant
correlation between the SR of the stimulus and the
fraction of individuals submitting bids to change
their answers (R
2 ¼ 0.045, p ¼ 0.053), and when
SR was included as a control variable in the passive
phase model, signiﬁcance remained and changed
only slightly for the ROIs. This suggests that sacred-
ness was not confounded with SR. We also tested
alternative models that controlled for the length and
the syntax of each statement, none of which greatly
changed the signiﬁcance of the activations in the ROIs.
Only the left and right inferior parietal lobules
showed the opposite activation pattern, with greater
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Figure 2. Functional localizer for brain regions with differential activity to deontic (yellow) and utilitarian (green) processing
(p , 0.005, extent   53). Regions were classiﬁed as deontic when the participant indicated that their choice was based on
rights and wrongs, and utilitarian when their choice was based on costs and beneﬁts. These regions were then applied to
the passive phase activation in which each statement had been presented individually in the absence of choice. Each statement
was categorized based on whether the participant sold a particular personal value during an auction held after the brain ima-
ging session (bid) or opted out of the auction for that value (optout). At the time of imaging, participants did not know
that they were going to have the opportunity to sell these values for real money. The left temporoparietal junction (MNI
coordinates: 263, 239, 42) showed signiﬁcantly greater activity for the optout statements than the bid statements (T ¼
3.19, p ¼ 0.003), indicating that these were processed in the deontic region. Both the left and right inferior parietal lobule
(MNI coordinates: 245, 272, 46 and 48, 266, 35) had the opposite pattern (T ¼ 4.09, p ¼ 0.001), which was driven primar-
ily by the not chosen bid statements, indicating that these statements were processed in utilitarian regions. Vertical scale on bar
graphs is estimated beta values for the individual conditions+s.e.m. across all subjects.
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coincided with cost/beneﬁt decisions (ﬁgure 2). This
suggests that these regions activate for items that have
a measurable utility or value. This is consistent with
prior evidence implicating the parietal cortex in utility-
based decisions [23,24]. The other region most likely
to encode utilitarian values is the VMPFC and striatum
[18–22], but we did not observe a signiﬁcantly greater
activation to bid versus optout items in these regions
during the passive phase.
The auction mechanism was a unique aspect of our
experiment and suggests a new way to quantify sacred
values that is not solely dependent on self-report, but
there are assumptions behind its use. First, we
assume that individuals take the auction seriously. As
noted above, signing a document does not bind one
to the action that one is signing. It is therefore some-
what surprising that most people did not sell all of
their choices. The fact that participants took money
for some items and not others suggests that they
were adequately motivated to express their preferences
through their choices. The upper limit of $100, how-
ever, placed a boundary constraint on the auction,
which when averaged over all items, yielded a low
value per item in expectation (the framing of the auc-
tion explicitly instructed participants to value each
item in the $1–100 range, and all participants’ ques-
tions about the auction pertained to how to earn the
most money). Although $100 may have been insufﬁ-
cient to buy some answers, this could be true for any
amount of money offered. The distribution of bids,
however, suggests that this was not the case (see the
electronic supplementary material). Although the dis-
tribution was dominated bimodally by $1 and optout,
the ask values showed a declining frequency towards
the $100 boundary, which could be ﬁt by a gamma
distribution. This indicates a decreasing marginal
exchange value, and a higher upper limit would not
have made a signiﬁcant difference in items that were
not auctioned.
Our experiment dovetails with a large literature on
the neural correlates of moral judgement [12–17].
However,itdiffersinthatitinitiallymeasuredthenatur-
al mode of processing sacred values in a way that
was relatively unconstrained by a choice framework.
This is particularly important for the scientiﬁc study
of sacred values, because one cannot ethically place
volunteers in real situations that would test such
values. However, recent ﬁndings in neuroeconomics
have demonstrated that ‘choiceless’ brain responses
are predictive of future actions [38,39]. Here, we ﬁnd
tantalizing evidence of this for sacred values too. We
also found that the difference in VLPFC activation
between optout and bid items correlated with the
individual’s level of involvement in organizations
(ﬁgure 4). This suggests that neural markers for sacred-
ness extend to real-world decisions of group
membership. Moreover, when sacred values were con-
tradicted by their opposites, we observed a signiﬁcant
increase in amygdala activation, which suggests the
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Figure 3. Additional regions identiﬁed in which sacred (optout) items resulted in greater activation than non-sacred (bid) items
during the passive phase (p , 0.005, extent   53). These included the left ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (LVLPFC) and the
right amygdala. Relative to the other three conditions, only the not chosen optout items resulted in more amygdala activation.
The latter statements represent the most repugnant items to the individual (those not chosen and not auctioned) and would be
expected to provoke the most arousal, which is consistent with the idea that when sacred values are violated they induce out-
rage [1–3].
760 G. S. Berns et al. Neural evidence of sacred values
Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B (2012)presence of an arousal response and is consistent with
the hypothesized role of emotion, especially negative
emotions, when sacred values are violated [1–3,10].
Our results complement existing research in sacred
values and may have implications for policymakers
[1,2], although further research in conditions that emu-
late policymaking environments will be required to
make the case. Economic, foreign and military policies
are typically based on utilitarian considerations. More
speciﬁcally, it is believed that those who challenge a
functioning social contract should concede if an ade-
quate trade-off is provided (e.g. sanctions or other
incentives). However, when individuals hold some
values to be sacred, they fail to make trade-offs, render-
ing positive or negative incentives ineffective at best.
Our results suggest that individuals naturally retrieve
sacred values as deontic rules, not as representations
of utility, providing the ﬁrst neurobiological evidence
for what has been previously conjectured [3].
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